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Abstract 
How foreign-born workers affect the domestic labor market has been a long-standing debate in 
the history of the United States. Occupations in the fields of Science, Technology, Engineering 
and Mathematics are a fast-growing segment of the U.S. labor market. The purpose of this thesis 
is to answer three questions: (1) Do foreign born workers with H-1B visas workers impact native 
employment within the STEM sectors? (2) Does the prevailing average wage of an H-1B visa 
worker have an impact on the wages of native born employees? (3) How is international student 
enrollment affected by employer’s demand for the H-1B visa. After analyzing the available data, 
my findings suggest that H-1B workers are used as a complement to native workers and there is 
no significant impact on the wages of native workers, however international enrollment is 
negatively affected by an increase in demand for the H-1B visa.  
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1. Introduction  
  On April 18, 2017, President Trump signed the Buy American, Hire American Executive 
Order, which attempts to create higher wages and employment rates for US workers and to 
protect their economic interests by rigorously enforcing and administering [their] immigration 
laws (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2017). At the heart of this debate lies 
the “Specialty Occupation and Fashion Models” visa, more commonly known as the H-1B visa. 
The order directed the Department of Homeland Security to co-ordinate with other government 
agencies to advance policies to help ensure H-1B visas are awarded to only the most-skilled or 
highest-paid beneficiaries (USCIS, 2017).   
After the President signed the executive order, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) has increased its scrutiny of H-1B applicants. In 2017, the USCIS sent out 
40% more requests for additional information (Kasperkevic, 2018). Two additional strains were 
also imposed on employers. First, the process of applying for the visa has become more complex 
and time consuming, and second, if the USCIS believes that the employer does not need the H-
1B recipient for the entire three-year period, the USCIS will issue a visa for a shorter time 
(Kasperkevic, 2018). Many employers believe that America has not and continues to not produce 
enough graduates that are appropriately skilled to fill these jobs. Therefore, they need to bring in 
foreign-born workers to fill the gaps (Kasperkevic, 2018). Others believe that the reform of the 
H-1B visa could be beneficial because it would highlight any potential misuses of the program 
since it will identify any loopholes and exploitations of the program (Kasperkevic, 2018). 
 These new restrictions and additional information requests have already impacted the 
labor market. Due to the Administration’s new policies, skilled workers from countries such as 
India appear to be turning away from the United States (US) and to countries like Canada instead 
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(Smith, 2018). Canada is a country where racial anxieties appear to be notably less prevalent, and 
it admits much greater numbers of high-skilled immigrants relative to its population (Smith, 
2018). In 2017 alone, Canada increased its intake of skilled workers by 7.5% and announced a 
new program to approve visas for these workers in 2 weeks in contrast to the 6 or 7 months it 
takes in the US (Smith, 2018). Losing foreign-born workers can potentially be a huge problem 
for the United States, as skilled immigrants are a key part of the US economy (Smith, 2018). 
Between 1995 and 2005, immigrants have started more than half of the new businesses in Silicon 
Valley and as of 2011 more than 40% of the Fortune 500 companies were started by immigrants 
or their children (Smith, 2018).   
 However, there is another school of thought which believes that non-immigrant workers 
on H-1B visas are being hired over qualified American workers because the H-1B visa allows 
employers to pay those workers less. There is research that suggests that this concern may be 
overblown (Smith, 2018). There is evidence which suggests that companies that have the chance 
to hire more H-1B workers' pay lower wages, but there is also evidence that shows that H-1B 
workers are not paid less than native-born Americans, after accounting for their age and skill 
levels (Smith, 2018). In turn, these diffuse companies and allow businesses to innovate faster and 
hire more workers as well as pay higher wages (Smith, 2018). Skilled foreigners help keep new 
ideas flowing in technology clusters like Silicon Valley; Austin, Texas; and Raleigh, North 
Carolina (Smith, 2018). A study by economists Giovanni Peri, Kevin Shih, and Chad Sparber 
found that increases in [foreign] Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematical (STEM) 
workers are associated with significant wage gains for college-educated native workers. Their 
results imply that foreign STEM [workers] increase total factor productivity growth in US cities 
(Smith, 2018). Therefore, if the new immigration policies break the wage growth cycle, the tech 
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industry may decide to relocate to countries where policies are more immigrant friendly like 
Canada, or even emerging economies like China or India (Smith, 2018). The move of the tech 
industry would have very significant impacts on the labor force, resulting in fewer desired jobs 
and lower wages for American workers, skilled and unskilled (Smith, 2018). 
 The H-1B policy does not only affect existing native workers and foreign-born workers 
but also the future foreign-born labor force, i.e. international students. The number of F-1 visas 
(which allows international students to enroll in United States colleges and universities), had 
decreased by 17% in the year that ended in September of 2017 (Kavilanz, 2018). The 'America 
First' mantra seems to be causing [international students] some anxiety and concern. It appears to 
be negatively affecting schools who rely heavily on the enrollment of international students. The 
biggest decline in visa approvals in 2017 were seen among students from Asian countries, 
particularly those from China and India who usually account for the largest number of F-1 visas 
(Kavilanz, 2018). Instead, students are choosing to go to countries like Canada, Germany, and 
Australia. These countries are making it easier for international students to stay in the country 
after they graduate and become part of the workforce (Kavilanz, 2018). The Administration’s 
tougher stance on the H-1B foreign work visa makes it harder for new graduates to remain in the 
country and it could be deterring overseas students from applying to American colleges 
(Kavilanz, 2018).  
 In my analysis I focused on three research questions: (1) Does having H-1B visa workers 
affect native employment within the STEM sector? (2) Does the prevailing average wage of an 
H-1B visa worker have an impact on native employees’ annual average wages? (3) How is 
international student enrollment affected by the demand for the H-1B visa? The first two 
questions focus primarily on how holders of the visa impact native (United States Citizens) 
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proportional employment and their wages in the US STEM sectors. The third question may allow 
policy makers to see how changing policy regarding a work visa could affect college and 
university enrollment in the US in the following years. 
 My findings regarding my first question suggest that there is a positive relationship 
between the employment of H-1B workers and native workers within the STEM sector. The 
relationship varies across different states in the US. The interesting states to consider are the ones 
that hold the highest H-1B holders such as California, Texas, New York and Michigan which 
showed no significance at any level which implies that H-1B visa workers are not used as 
substitutes but as complements. On the second question, I found that H-1B prevailing wages in 
the STEM sector have no impact on native average wages. This result varies between the states, 
again with an emphasis on California, Texas, New York and Michigan which showed no 
significance among the coefficients. On the third question regarding enrollment of international 
students, I show that enrollment is impacted by the demand/competitiveness for the H-1B visa. 
These results hold strong implications for future policy because they indicate that any decrease in 
the cap for the visa will likely have a negative effect on enrollment in US colleges and 
universities with down the road impacts on the US labor market within the STEM sector. As 
well, since the policy affects international enrollment it means that tuitions in colleges and 
universities will be impacted and may need to change based on the number of foreign students 
who are still willing to attend universities and colleges in the United States.   
 In my study, I analyzed how the caps on the H-1B visa effected the STEM labor market 
in terms of proportions of foreign and native workers and their average wages. I am contributing 
support to the existing literature because my results show similar results. My study differs from 
the ones above because I could not examine individual level data but analyzed aggregate impacts 
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at the state level.  I am also adding support to the literature previously published on international 
student enrollment and the effect the H-1B cap policy has on their decision to attend university 
or college in the US. I am contributing to future literature by combining the current effects of the 
H-1B visa on the STEM sector and creating an OLS regression to estimate how the international 
student enrollment over the past 16 years has been affected by the decrease in the cap of the H-
1B visa. I am also attempting to contribute more recent analysis to the literature since there have 
not been any studies published about the implications of President Trump's current visa policy 
decisions.  
 This paper is divided into nine sections. In the first section, I provide background on the 
H-1B visa, as well as on the F1 and Optional Practical Training (OPT) status. The second section 
contains literature review, divided into subsections. My third and fourth sections will discuss 
where I obtained my data from, the variables used and a subsection for the limitations of the 
data. Sections five through seven will discuss my methodology, results, discussion and a 
subsection for policy implications. Section eight contains my concluding remarks.  
1.1 H-1B, F1 and OPT Background  
 The H-1B visa was created by the Immigration Act of 1990 and is a class of visa that 
allows employers to hire foreigners to work on a temporary basis in jobs that require highly 
specialized knowledge (Pew Research Center, 2017). In order for a job to qualify as a specialty 
occupation it must meet one of the criteria outlined by the USCIS. The job must require at least a 
bachelor’s degree or higher and this must be common practice for the job industry. Essentially, 
the employer has to prove that the occupation is so complex or unique that it can only be 
performed by an individual with a degree (USCIS, 2017). Furthermore, the nature of the specific 
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duties is so specialized and complex that the knowledge required to perform the duties is usually 
associated with the attainment of a bachelor’s or higher degree (USCIS, 2017). 
 When the visa was introduced in 1990, the United States government capped it at 65,000. 
In 1999, the cap was raised to 115,000 visas and then again in 2001, to 195,000. Due to the 
economic slowdown and backlog in 2002, fiscal year 2003 was the only year that the cap was not 
fully utilized (Salmon and Sherk, 2008). Since then, the cap was lowered back to 65,000 and 
employers have used every authorized visa. The visas run out very fast in the lottery: in 2007, 
employers used up the entire quota in less than a day after the USCIS started to accept 
applications. It is important to note that there are an extra 20,000 visas issued to foreign-born 
workers with a master’s degree or higher and due to trade deals, alternative visas for countries 
such as Canada, Chile, Mexico and Singapore (Shih, 2016).  
STEM occupations play a critical role in the United States economy. According to 
American Immigration Council, STEM workers are responsible for many of the new and 
innovative ideas and technologies that create jobs and raise the living standards of U.S. 
households (American Immigration Council, 2017). Foreign-born workers make up a growing 
share of the US STEM workforce. In fact, foreign-born STEM workers are more likely than 
native born STEM workers to obtain a patent in computing, electronics, medical devices and 
pharmaceuticals (American Immigration Council, 2017).   
In the US, the total number of STEM workers has almost doubled since 1990. Currently, 
STEM workers plus health and social science professionals make up about 12.6% of the 
workforce (American Immigration Council, 2017). As well, since 1990 the share of foreign-born 
workers in the STEM workforce has also almost doubled. In 2015, there were 3.9 million 
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foreign-born workers in the STEM field, almost 19.3% of the workforce (American Immigration 
Council, 2017). 
  The F1 visa is a class of visa that is issued to international students who are attending an 
academic program or English Language Program at a university or college in the United States 
(F1 Student, no year). F1 students are required to keep a certain minimum course load in order to 
be considered full time students. They can remain in the United States 60 days beyond the length 
of time that it takes for them to complete their academic program, unless they have applied for a 
stay and work visa under the Optional Practical Training (OPT) program (F1 Student, no year). 
 The United States has more foreign students enrolled in their colleges and universities 
than any other country in the world. Much of the growth in the enrollment of international 
students has happened since the start of the Great Recession (Pew Global Center, 2017). Students 
come from all over the world, but 54% of the students come from China, India and South Korea 
(Pew Global Center, 2017).   
Once an international student has graduated, they are eligible for a different status— the 
OPT status, which allows students to work in the United States for a year. The job they seek 
must be directly related to their major field of study in order to qualify for OPT (H1Base, 2000). 
Generally, after the OPT year runs out, the student changes their visa status to the H-1B visa 
upon finding a sponsoring employer. There is a one-time extension for students who qualify 
under STEM degrees for 17 extra months (H1Base, 2000). Part of their decision is based on how 
the H-1B visa policy is implemented under each administration and the ease and expense of 
obtaining one. In my analysis, I looked at how the change in demand affected whether or not 
students chose to enroll in United States universities and colleges. 
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1.2 Why STEM? 
Due to our reliance on technology, the STEM fields are growing. There are more 
opportunities for students to gain a job in the field especially with the Silicon Valley booming 
and many states becoming homes for new technologies.   
The H-1B visa goes to applicants with a specialty occupation and those are ones with a 
bachelor’s or higher degree. Over 99% of the STEM employment was in an occupation that 
typically require some type of postsecondary education for entry, compared with 36% of overall 
employment (Fayer, S., Lacey, A., & Watson, A. 2017). Between May 2009 and May 2015, 
there were over 800,000 net STEM jobs that were added to the U.S. economy (Fayer, S., Lacey, 
A., & Watson, A. 2017). Since the STEM sector is a fast paced, fast growing industry I decided 
to focus my analyses on the sector that has the highest recipients for the H-1B visa.       
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Diversity within the workplace  
 Diversity within the workplace has become a common focus of almost every firm. Firms 
are trying to showcase their inclusivity by hiring people of different genders, races, nationalities 
and religions. This leads to the question of does diversity have an impact on the workforce or is 
it just nice to include everyone? Herring (2009) published a study to analyze how race and 
gender diversity in the workplace can affect firms’ outcomes, such as their sales revenue, their 
number of customers, and whether with diversity their market share and profits increase. He 
developed seven hypotheses each looking at how one specific variable, such as a business 
organization’s sales revenue or its number of customers, changes as race and gender diversity in 
the workplace increases. Herring used data from the National Organizations Survey from 1996 to 
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1997 to gauge business performance and track racial diversity. To gauge business performance, 
he used the variables: sales revenue, number of customers, relative market share, and relative 
profitability. To track racial diversity, he used two different indexes: Racial Index of Diversity, 
and Asymmetrical Index of Diversity. 
 He found that racial diversity was associated with increased sales revenue, more 
customers, greater market share, and greater relative profits, and that gender diversity was 
associated with increased sales revenue, more customers and greater profits. This study is 
important to note because it gives support to the idea that diversity can help a company do better 
in the marketplace, and to the idea that H-1B visas/foreign born workers can strengthen the U.S. 
economy.  
 Another paper that looks at general diversity in the workplace is a study done by Hunt 
(2011). In this paper, she analyzed immigrants from different visa categories to see how they 
performed in the labor market, and whether their contributions made a significant impact on the 
labor market. She addressed the research question of immigrants in the workplace by measuring 
their wages and their success in creating, disseminating and commercializing knowledge as well 
as activities with public benefits that are likely to increase U.S. total factor productivity. Hunt 
(2011) specifically measured success as patenting, commercializing, and licensing patents; 
publishing books and papers; writing papers for major conferences; and starting successful 
companies.  
 Hunt’s study used the 2003 National Survey of College Graduates to quantify the study. 
The data emphasized the importance of the entry visa, not the visa that the person currently 
holds. Hunt found that immigrants who entered the US on a student/trainee visa, or on a 
temporary work visa (H-1B, etc.) had a large advantage over native workers in wages, in 
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patenting, and in publishing. She also found that immigrants who entered with legal permanent 
residence did not out-perform native workers. Lastly, she showed that immigrants were more 
likely to start companies than native workers who had similar attributes.  
 Hunt's study is an important addition to my analysis because it shows how the H-1B visa 
holder does not get paid less, contrary to the media and popular belief. In contrast, Herring’s 
(2009) study showed much broader effects of race and gender diversification in the workplace, 
and supports the idea that diversity does in fact have a positive benefit on the economy. Hunt’s 
(2011) study showed how accepting applications with different entry visas can further economic 
development and provide more diversity in the workplace while creating more innovation. 
Herring’s study provided a solid background on the positive effects of diversity on the U.S. 
economy, while Hunt’s study shows the importance of bringing people in on a work visa or a 
student visa to the US economy and how it can boost the economy. Ultimately, both studies 
establish that there are benefits to having workers that are not necessarily from the same country. 
The outcome relates to my study because it helps support the question of how the H-1B visa has 
affected the United States’ labor force and if the program worth continuing. Both these studies 
help support the notion that continuing this program will benefit consumers and producers.  
 
2.2 H-1B Visa Cap Trends  
 Mayda et al. (2017) studied the effects of the H-1B quota reduction using a triple 
difference strategy. The strategy determined the inner workings and effectiveness of the H-1B 
program to determine if the legislative negatively impacted the US economy. They compared the 
hiring of new and established H-1B workers in both non-profit and for-profit sectors before and 
after 2004. The authors wanted to see if the difference between the demand for the visa and the 
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cap would affect the employment of the person. The authors noted that the fiscal years 2008 and 
2009 were notable as aggregate demand for H-1B visas spiked and more than 150,000 
applications were received within the first filing week of each year. To keep up with the demand, 
the US government responded by distributing all cap-subject permits with a lottery for these 
years. Therefore, the authors examined whether the heightened intensity of rationing during the 
lottery years had stronger impacts on employment and other outcomes.  
 The authors’ analysis exploited a dataset on approved H-1B applications that was 
acquired through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The individual-level 
information allowed them to establish the education, experience, and occupation of each 
approved H-1B worker, which then allowed them to filter by the variables they wanted to study.  
 The triple indifference model used helped the authors quantify the decline in new H-1B 
employment in for-profit firms relative to what would have occurred in the absence of hiring 
restrictions. The authors found that the cap-subject skill groups experienced an approximate 20-
50% decline in H-1B employment relative to what it would have been if hiring outcomes were 
determined by firm demand, not legislation limit. H-1B employment fell by an additional 3-8% 
relative to the demand-driven level during the fiscal years 2008 and 2009.  
 The triple difference model that the authors designed removed the differential pre-trends 
between for-profit and non-profit sectors as well as between new and existing hires for each 
skill-specific labor market. The results remained stable, so the authors added more controls and 
added coexistent shocks to the visa, to see if the impact would change based off of the control 
variables.  
 It is important to note that with the cap reduction, H-1B employment fell without 
generating any offsetting rise in native employment. Thus, Mayda et al (2017) found the results 
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provided no evidence for short-run native and H-1B labor substitutability. The conclusion is 
useful for my study because it supports my hypothesis that H-1B workers are compliments to 
native workers and not substitutes. The result also suggested that innovation waned as native 
employment remained stable while specifically H-1B employment fell.  
 The authors also assessed whether the quota affected the selection of new H-1B 
employees and the types of firms that participate in the H-1B program. They established that the 
policy change also redistributed H-1B labor toward firms that employed 50 or more H-1B 
workers each year and away from employers that used the program less; ultimately the policy led 
to an increase in the concentration of H-1B workers in fewer firms.  
 In the end, the authors found that 80% of for-profit firms accounted for 40% of new H-
1B hires. The concentration then grew after the fall in cap, where 80% of the firms accounted for 
only 20% of new hires. The H-1B restrictions also led to a compositional shift in the new H-1B 
employment favoring Indian-born workers, computer-related occupations, and firms that used 
the H-1B program heavily. Their concluding interpretation of the results was that acute visa 
restrictions increased the importance of labor networks, economies of scale in hiring foreign-
labor, and skill in navigating the H-1B program. The work the authors did indicated that further 
reducing the H-1B cap was likely to further skew the characteristics of the H-1B program. 
Mayda et al.'s (2017) study highlights the limitations and vulnerabilities of the cap on the H-1B 
program and if taken further could possibly show the long-term consequences for cap reduction 
such as lost innovation or the tech sector moving out from the United States.  
 Watts (2001) argued that the debate over increasing the H-1B visa obscured fundamental 
flaws in the visa program such as compliance with the program. The debate was centered on the 
lack of IT workers: companies were rallying to increase the cap for the H-1B visa so that they 
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were able to hire foreign-born workers who had the satisfying qualifications. Opponents of the 
visa argued that companies should hire American workers and retrain them instead of raising the 
cap. Watts’s paper showed that the hiring of visa holders created a more open labor market, but it 
also restricted the worker to the specific employer that the visa was issued to. In turn, the binding 
of the employee to the employer affected the market in a different way – it created less labor 
market mobility for the foreign worker and more preference for cheap labor. Watts concluded by 
saying that loopholes in the H-1B program, combined with limitations on the Department of 
Labor’s ability to enforce H-1B requirements, gave employers an advantage over H-1B holders. 
These loopholes needed to be reduced so that H-1B workers were not being exploited. This study 
offered an alternative position from the other articles’ that I have analyzed because it claimed 
that employers were able to easily exploit the H-1B workers’ salaries, while other articles 
claimed that H-1B holders had a significant advantage in negotiating their salaries (Watts, 2001). 
This paper effectively pointed out what can be improved with the current visa policy to minimize 
loopholes and how policy makers can make the H-1B visa stronger for the future. Nonetheless, it 
did not provide enough evidence to explain how the loopholes are negatively affecting the 
program in the beginning, and it did not examine how changing the flaws of the H-1B program 
could equalize the playing field between H-1B holders and non H-1B holders.  
 Like Mayda et al (2017), Watt’s paper looked at the effects of the H-1B visa on the 
economy. It used a broader analysis and found loopholes in the policy that can motivate 
employers to shortchange workers. Mayda et al (2017) in contrast, provided a more in-depth 
analysis of how different firms (for profit and nonprofit) reacted to the shortage or influx of H-
1B workers.  
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 Despite the limitations of both analyses, the results should still be considered in future 
research. For the purpose of my study, I used Mayda et al's (2017) general conclusion that 
lowering H-1B employment does not affect native employment and hypothesize that the H-1B 
workers affect native workers in positively because it has been proven that the decrease in H-1B 
workers does not necessarily lead to an increase of native workers.  
 
2.3 Effects on salaries of Native and H-1B holders  
 Hayes and Lofstorm (2011) addressed the issue that H-1B workers were paid less than 
native workers and that firms actually profited from using a foreign-born worker rather than 
hiring a native worker. This study combined unique individual level H-1B data from USCIS and 
data from the 2009 American Community Survey to outline how certain variables impact 
earnings. Hayes and Lofstorm (2011) analyzed earning differences between H-1B visa holders 
and US born workers in STEM occupations. They found that the H-1B workers were younger 
and more skilled (measured by education) than US born workers in the same occupations. They 
did not find support for the notion that H-1Bs were paid less than similar native-born workers. 
Their evidence suggested that H-1B workers in some key STEM occupations were being paid 
more. I used this study to model my second regression of native workers' wages within the 
STEM sector being affected by H-1B workers prevailing average wages. I modified the 
regression by using natural logs.  
 The study used individual level data for people who received the H-1B visa from 2000 to 
2010. The authors focused their analysis on the year 2009 to obtain the results as current as 
possible given their dataset. For their analysis, the authors restricted their attention to those 
individuals between the ages of 22 and 64, with at least a Bachelor’s degree. They further 
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restricted their analysis to those working in the five major STEM occupation groups detailed 
below which constituted 74% of the 2009 H-1B holders.  
 The Hayes and Lofstorm (2011) used an estimated ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression of annual earnings first for the pooled sample of the included STEM occupations and 
then separately by occupational group. The OLS regression is similar to the model that I will 
build for my study because the model looks at the salary changes in the STEM sector controlling 
for education, experience and age. In my OLS model I will not be controlling for education, 
experience and age because I did not have access to that data. The authors also included a 
dummy variable for new H-1B visa holders and a separate variable for continuation. They also 
included a variable for naturalized immigrants in order to provide another benchmark for the 
earnings of H-1B workers. The coefficients on the naturalized immigrant indicator variable 
represented the log earnings difference between US born workers and naturalized immigrants.  
 The data showed that H-1B workers on average were younger and more highly educated 
than both naturalized immigrant and US born workers. H-1B workers were also more than twice 
as likely to possess a non-professional doctoral degree as a US born worker.  
 The average annual earnings of H-1B workers was about 10% higher than the average 
annual earnings of the sample of US born workers (Lofstorm and Hayes 2011). Overall, the data 
analysis pointed towards H-1B workers having both higher earnings and skill levels than US 
born workers.  
 When the authors added in and controlled for the variables age and education, the 
estimates revealed significantly higher earnings among both new and continuing H-1Bs by more 
than 20%. Compared to the US workers, the estimates showed that the conditional earnings 
difference between H-1B and US born workers was about 10% in favor of the temporary high 
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skilled foreign workers. The authors switched to looking at H-1B holders who renewed their 
visas to see if that had any implications on the results. The analysis showed that the renewed 
visas received a 16% salary bump, pointing toward an earnings advantage for H-1B IT workers 
overall.  
 Once age was controlled, earnings disadvantage turned to an H-1B salary premium of 
nearly 18% for new H-1B workers followed by an increase of close to 5% for those renewing 
their visas. The earnings advantage was to some extent driven by the higher schooling levels of 
H-1Bs compared to US born workers. When the authors controlled for education the overall H-
1B earnings declined. The last controls that the authors added were for occupation and fixed 
effects. The results suggested that the newly arrived H-1B workers earned close to 7% more than 
US born workers of the same age, education and specific IT occupation, with an additional 
increase of about 5% for those renewing their visas.  
 The results changed based on occupation. In the unadjusted model specification newly, 
arrived engineers using the H-1B appeared to earn more than their US counterparts. The results 
were counteracted upon renewal of the visa.  The same relationship was found for math and 
science occupations: there was an initial decrease in earnings for new H-1B holders but a raise 
upon visa renewal. When the authors controlled for education and age, the results failed to show 
an earnings difference between H-1Bs and their observed similar US counterparts. In healthcare 
occupations, H-1B workers appeared to earn more than their US born workers. However, the 
results declined once education was controlled for, and then the model moved in favor of the 
new H-1Bs holders.  
 In post-secondary education occupations, new H-1B workers earned more than US 
workers and received a boost when their visa was renewed. This advantage was overstated 
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because of the proportion of H-1B workers with doctorate degrees. The estimates with controlled 
education revealed a smaller advantage for new H-1B workers than their US counterparts. 
Industry and detailed occupational fixed effects did not affect the results. Overall, the results 
showed that H-1B holders had an earnings advantage over their US counterparts as well as a 
higher skill set. The major shortcoming of the experiment was that the authors did not control for 
gender and geographical location. This means that their data could have been disproportionately 
male and in high-income areas, such as Silicon Valley.  
 Overall, this paper helps elucidate why a foreign-born worker has a higher salary in the 
STEM fields, and how controlling for age and education does have an effect in the employer’s 
choice of giving the H-1B worker a higher salary. The study clearly shows that there is a 
difference between the wages paid to a native and a non-native born person. It disagrees with the 
argument that H-1B workers are hired because companies can pay them less and introduces the 
idea that foreign born workers may be more qualified due to their educational background than 
native born workers, which is a possible reason for their salary increase.  
 Mithas and Lucas (2010) examined how visa and immigration policies were related to the 
salaries of American and foreign IT professionals employed in the United States. This paper used 
50,000 foreign and American IT professionals in the United States to study the wages of foreign 
and US citizen IT professionals.  
 Mithas and Lucas (2010) tested four hypothesizes to discern how a non-native IT 
professional’s salary changes based on their educational qualifications, work experience, and 
whether the H-1B visa cap was fully utilized.  
 The authors found support for the first hypothesis: IT professionals without U.S. 
citizenship earned 8.9% more than those with U.S. citizenship and this difference was 
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statistically significant. The authors also found support for the second hypothesis: IT 
professionals on H-1B or other work visas earned 6.8% more than those with U.S. citizenship 
and the relationship was also statistically significant. They also found support for the third 
hypothesis as IT professionals with a green card earned 12.9% more than those with a U.S. 
citizenship and the difference was also statistically significant. Moreover, they tested whether 
green card holders had a salary premium compared to those with an H-1B visa or a different 
work visa. An IT professional holding a green card earned 6.1% more than one with a work visa 
and the difference in coefficients of a green card holder against a work visa was positive as well 
as statistically significant.  
 When looking for the effects of hypothesis four, the authors created an indicator variable 
to designate if the visa cap was fully utilized that year. As well, they included interaction terms 
involving the dummy variable that indicates citizenship or visa status. The authors found support 
for hypothesis, and these finding suggested that lower and fully utilized visa caps increased the 
salary premium for H-1B professionals. Interestingly, the coefficient of the interaction term 
involving visa cap utilizations and green card was determined to be statistically insignificant, 
suggesting visa caps had no effect on salary premiums of green card holders.  
 Mithas and Lucas (2010) furthered their study using year-wise regressions and found that 
non-US citizens earned statistically significant salary premiums from 2000 to 2005, when 
controlling for education, experience, demographic and other institutional variables. During 2000 
to 2003, the number of actual H-1B visas issued was lower than the maximum limit of 195,000 
but the authors observed salary premiums for non-US citizen IT professionals during those years. 
During 2004, maximum quotas came down to pre-1999 levels of 65,000 and perhaps as a result, 
the premium rose significantly that year. During 2005, Congress allowed an additional 20,000 H-
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1B work visas for foreign professionals graduating from US universities and some impact in the 
form of lower salary premiums was observed in 2005.   
 Both papers, Lofstorm and Hayes’ (2011) and Mithas and Lucas’ (2010), analyzed how 
H-1B workers’ salaries changed compared to native workers’ salaries. The papers used different 
data sets, but both found that H-1B visa holders had an advantage when it came to earnings 
because they tended to be higher skilled workers. Hayes and Lofstorm (2011) conducted a more 
detailed study, having broken down the estimates to the occupational level. Mithas and Lucas 
(2010) kept a broader analysis and looked at earnings each year as well as the cap fluctuations 
from 2000 to 2005. Of these studies, Lofstorm and Hayes’ (2011) is more relevant to my analysis 
because it conducts a similar experiment, except instead of breaking down the H-1B holders into 
their individual job occupations. I looked the STEM sector as a whole broken down by state, and 
not as individual level data compared to the native worker’s wages in the STEM sector. To help 
further both studies, Lofstorm and Hayes (2011) and Mithas and Lucas (2010) could have used a 
variable for gender, and analyzed if there was a wage gap within the H-1B salary since the 
STEM sector is predominately male.   
 
2.4 Productivity  
 Choudhury, Ruiz, and Wilson (2012) analyzed the geography of H-1B visa requests 
focusing on the metropolitan areas with the highest demand between the years 2001 and 2011. 
Choudhury et al. (2012) saw that the demand for H-1B workers fluctuated with economic and 
political cycles over the ten-year time period. They found that the fluctuation reflected the 
employers’ need for high-skilled temporary workers. The authors also found that 106 
metropolitan areas had at least 250 requests for the H-1B workers in the 2010-2011 period. On 
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average, there were about 2.2 requests for H-1Bs per 1,000 workers in the 106 metro areas, 
compared to 2.4 for the nation as a whole.  
 The metropolitan areas varied by the number of employers using the H-1B program and 
the cap status of the employers. The high demand in the corporate metro areas came primarily 
from private employers subjected to the annual visa cap. Whereas research metro areas’ demand 
was driven by universities and other research institutions that were exempted from the cap. In the 
mixed metro areas, a variety of employers demanded temporary high-skilled foreign workers.   
 In particular, STEM employers accounted for more than half the requests in 92 of the 106 
metropolitan areas. The most popular profession requesting H-1B workers was computer 
occupations in all but 11 of the 106 metro areas, where engineers, healthcare practitioners, and 
postsecondary teachers were more requested.  
 Lastly, the study found that H-1B visa fees that were designated for skills training and 
STEM education had not been distributed proportionately to metropolitan areas requesting the 
highest number of H-1B workers. The study showed that metropolitan areas with a high demand 
for H-1B workers were receiving on average only $3.09 per working age person (16 years and 
older) of the technical skills training grant compared to $15.26 for metropolitan areas that had a 
lower demand for H-1Bs from 2001-2011. STEM education funds were distributed similarly, 
with high H-1B demand metros receiving only $1.00 per working age person compared to 
$14.10 in the low H-1B demand metros. The lack of funds may be reasons why the metro areas 
differed in their demands for H-1B visas. Areas that did not receive much funding for technical 
training or STEM education had a higher demand for these visas. 
 Similarly, Peri, Shih, & Sparber (2015) detailed the spread of H-1B workers in each state. 
The authors wanted to quantify the long-run effects of increased city-level STEM employment 
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on labor market outcomes for STEM, college, and non-college educated native-born workers. 
The authors exploited the introduction of the H-1B visa program in 1990 and the differential 
effect that the visas had on bringing foreign-born college-educated workers to 219 US cities from 
1990 to 2010. For their empirical analysis, the authors used a variation in foreign-born STEM 
workers across US cities and time periods to estimate their impact on native wages and 
employment (Peri, Shih, & Sparber, 2015). The authors found that a 1% point increase in the 
foreign STEM share of a city’s total employment increased wage growth of native college-
educated labor by about 7% to 8% points and the wage growth of non-college educated natives 
by 3% to 4% points. The analysis showed that there was an insignificant effect on the relative 
employment of those two groups. Results indicated that STEM workers spurred economic 
growth by increasing productivity, especially of those college-educated workers. 
  Choudhury et al (2012) did not address the effect that the H-1B visa had on native-born 
salaries or employment. My study differs in that I attempted to show how the H-1B visa affects 
native-born employment. Choudhury et al.'s (2012) study is good background on the breakdown 
of where the H-1B STEM workers are aggregating and will be used as a reference for when I 
discuss my results at the state level to see if they are consistent with the metropolitan areas.   
 Peri, Shih, and Sparber (2015) conducted a similar study to the one I will conduct: they 
looked at the productivity in the cities, as well as compared the quantity of H-1B holders to the 
quantity of native workers. My study employs a different dataset, and thus may yield different 
results based on the initial distribution of foreign STEM occupations across the states. H-1B 
holders might have been driven towards certain cities due to certain amenities and lifestyle 
choices.  
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2.5 Policy Implications on International Students 
 Changes to the H-1B visa policy do not only affect current workers on the H-1B visa. 
The policy changes can also influence the decision international students make when applying to 
study in the United States or deciding to stay after their four years of studying. Admissions and 
retention rates of the students may be negatively affected when the cap is decreased, or 
enrollment may be positively affected when the cap is increased. 
 A study conducted by Alberts and Hazen (2006) examined the incentives and 
disincentives that influence international students to stay in the US or return to their home 
country. The authors found 64% of respondents believe that the United States had better career 
opportunities than their home country. Another factor that impacted the students desire to stay 
was better standard of living (Hazen and Alberts, 2006). Finally, and most surprising, 8% of the 
respondents said that the current political situation was an advantage to stay in the United States.  
 Alberts and Hazen (2006) reported the disadvantages of international students returning 
to their home countries, the top being that half their respondents saying that there is poor job 
opportunities back home. Another reason was concerns about restrictive or hierarchical career 
structures in the home country. The last factors were poor economic standard of living, the 
political situation and poorer quality of life.  
 Alberts and Hazen (2006) did ask the respondents about their home country's benefits. 
The most common answer as to why students would return home was to be with their friends and 
family. Some students reported that in their home country there was a better quality of life and 
the last factor was some students felt the responsibility to return skills to their home country.  
 The most common response for international student's decision to leave the US was 
feeling alienated from US culture (Hazen and Alberts, 2006). The second reason was another 
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cultural and personal issue of students feeling different understanding of friendship and career. 
Racism was also found as a disadvantage to the students but surprisingly the authors did not find 
a significant relationship between the home region and students citing 'racism'. The last factor 
was poor working conditions and quality of life in the US.  
 I included this study in my literature because it is important to note that there are other 
factors that encourage international students and discouragement other students when deciding 
staying the United States after their undergraduate degree is completed. This study was 
conducted as six focus groups and informal conversations with international students from a 
variety of disciplines and countries at the University of Minnesota. Therefore, there are 
limitations of this study in that the questionnaire that Alberts and Hazen (2006) created was 
distributed to many non-native-English speakers and the study was focusing student decision 
making as the key factor of student migration but it is one of many factors that help explain 
migration patterns (Hazen and Alberts, 2006). The last limitation of this study is that it was 
conducted more than 10 years ago when the political climate was very different than it is now. I 
hypothesize if the study was done now, majority of the responses rank political climate and 
racism higher on their scale of disadvantages to the United States. 
 Shih (2016) examined the relationship between international enrollment and the openness 
of the United States’ skilled labor market, which is regulated by the H-1B program. He used 
gravity regressions that showed that H-1B visa issuances to a country were positively and 
significantly related to the number of international students from that country. His causal 
estimates of the impact of labor market openness were achieved by exploiting the dramatic fall in 
the H-1B visa cap when it fell in October of 2003. The triple indifference estimates showed that 
the decrease lowered the foreign enrollment by 10%.   
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 This study is worth noting because it shows how expansive immigrant visa policy is, and 
how changes in the program affect other parts of the United States economy. The study is 
supportive background on how the H-1B policy affects future enrolment of international 
students. International students do not just affect the US economy when they obtain an OPT or 
an H-1B visa but also their consumption when they are studying for the 4 years helps smaller 
town economies grow, as discussed in a paper by Feerasta et al. (2011). I used Shih (2016) to 
model my fourth regression and created a demand variable to show the competitiveness of the H-
1B visa and the affect on enrolled international students.  
  Feerasta et al. (2011) looked specifically at how international students could be used as a 
possible state stimulus. Their belief was international students have the unique ability to enrich 
the experiences of domestic students, as well as impact the economy with direct expenditures. 
Moreover, the data showed many international students stay in the United States after graduation 
because of programs like the H-1B, which add to existing firms or establish new companies. 
Feerasta et al. (2011) pointed out that many rust belt states were looking to transform themselves 
from being dependent on manufacturing and agriculture to more diverse knowledge-based 
economies. International students can be used as a catalyst to further economic growth at the 
state level. The results in the study conducted by Feerasta et al. (2011) showed that domestic 
students were concerned about their state’s economic future and had a positive perception of the 
economic benefits of international students. They also supported policy to increase international 
enrollment. In turn, international students have had a more positive view of globalization and the 
positive economic impact of internationalization of education.  
 As important as it is, this study has limitations. For example, Feerasta et al.'s (2011) 
sample responses were drawn only from one university in Ohio. Therefore, it cannot be 
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concluded that these sentiments are felt at other state schools that offer four-year programs. The 
study was also based on the author’s convenience and not on a random sample. This means that 
the results may be exposed to self-selection bias as individuals who have an interest in Ohio’s 
economy and international students may have chosen to complete the survey over others without 
an interest in the topic.  
 A study done by Kato and Sparber (2013), discusses how restrictive H-1B policy has 
affected the average quality of prospective international students who face reduced U.S. 
employment opportunity after graduation. The authors used a difference-in-difference estimation 
to identify the effect of current policy on the selection of foreign students interested in U.S. 
education, because of their five control countries: Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico and 
Singapore. The authors chose these countries as their control because international students from 
the five countries are less bound by the H-1B restrictions because they are able to obtain a work 
permit that is a substitute for an H-1B visa.  
 Kato and Sparber used College Board dataset that measured the SAT scores of 
international students and found that visa restrictions have reduced SAT scores of prospective 
students by 10 to 20 points. Their paper provided support that restrictive immigration policies 
has an effect on the quality of international students that are interested in US education. Kato and 
Sparber (2013) had a unique way of measuring prospective international students by using the 
SAT scores but there are limitations of the data. For example, not all international students who 
take the SATs apply to US schools and there is no way of identifying which students do and do 
not. As well, it omitted students who took the ACT exam. Another limitation of their dataset is 
that admission offices weight applications differently. Some institutes find that GPA is more 
important than the SAT scores and others place SAT scores higher than other factors. For the 
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purpose of their study, it was a unique feature but it would not allow Kato and Sparber to further 
their analysis to see how the pool of international applicants weakened.  
 Kato and Sparber (2013), Feerasta et al. (2011), and Shih (2016) all provide support to 
the notion that international students are considering the H-1B visa when applying to the US and 
evaluating their chances of staying in the country after four years.  
 In my study, I analyzed how the H-1B visa effected the STEM labor market in terms of 
proportions of foreign and native workers and their average wages. I am contributing support to 
the existing literature because my results show similar results. My study differs from the ones 
above because I did not look at individual level data but analyzed aggregate impacts at the state 
level. I am also adding support to the literature previously published on international student 
enrollment and the effect the H-1B policy has on their decision to attend university or college in 
the US. I am contributing to future literature by combining the current effects of the H-1B visa 
on the STEM sector and creating an OLS regression to estimate how the international student 
enrollment over the past 16 years has been affected by the decrease in the cap of the H-1B visa. I 
am also attempting to contribute more recent analysis to the literature since there have not been 
any studies published about the implications of President Trump's current policy decisions.  
 
3. Data Collection  
 
 I obtained the historical prevailing wage data for H-1B visa workers from the United 
States Department of Labor website, specifically the Office of Foreign Labor Certification 
(OFLC). I used the Historical Case Disclosure Data for the Labor Certification Application 
(LCA) Programs that had historical data for the H-1B, H-1B1, E-3 wages and the number of 
applications from employers broken down by state. The number of applications accepted was 
used as the number of H-1B workers. 
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 For native wages, I obtained data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational 
Employment Statistics (OES). OES provides employment and wage estimates annually for over 
800 occupations. Estimates were available for the entire nation, individual states, metropolitan, 
and nonmetropolitan areas. OES published the number of native workers in each occupation 
which I added together for the total for the STEM sector in each year. For the purpose of my 
study, I used the OES data broken down into States from 2008 to 2016. As well, OES published 
the definition of STEM occupations and that list was used to clean the dataset for H-1B and 
native wages.  
 STEM occupations are broken down into these groups: life and physical science, 
engineering, mathematics, information technology occupations, social science occupations, 
architecture occupations and health occupations. 
 Further, each STEM occupation can be categorized into one of the five types of STEM 
occupations:  
1. Research, development, design or practitioner occupations  
2. Technologist and technician occupation  
3. Postsecondary teaching occupations  
4. Managerial occupations  
5. Sales occupations  
 The OFLC datasets are publicly available and can be used to fit any study. For my study, 
I cleaned and filtered the datasets in the following ways. 
 The 2015 LCA Disclosure Data had a column for “Willful Violator” Employer. “Willful 
violator” or “willful violator employer” means an employer that meets all the following standard: 
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The agency finds that the employer has committed either a willful failure or a misrepresentation 
of a material fact (two of the Labor Condition Application (LCA). 
 This category is for employers and is not specified in other datasets, so I decided to 
remove the column since it was not specified in the other datasets. The definition was taken from 
the United States Department of Labor Fact Sheet #62S.  
For the number of enrolled international students, I obtained data from the Institute of 
International Education Inc. The Institute published data on international enrollment across the 
United States, how many of those students continued to Optional Practical Training (OPT), and 
the total enrollment from 1948 to 2017. For my study, I used the institutional data on enrolled 
international students, and Optional Practical Training (OPT) between the years 2001 to 2016. 
The cap number and H1B petitions accepted data was collected by the USCIS Yearbook 
of Immigration Statistics from 2001 to 2016.  
My GDP data was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This dataset was 
already sorted by state and gave the option for All Industry Total.  
Table 1 shows my summary statistics for my models 1 through 8. My dependent 
variables, number of native employees, average wage for native STEM had means of 168, 207, 
and 2.285e+06, respectively. The maximum is 7,290, and 44,400, respectively. My independent 
variables, number of H-1B STEM employees, average prevailing wage for H-1B STEM, and 
GDP all industry total, have minimums of 7, 4,779, and 8.472 respectively. The maximums are 
168,207, 431,270, and 13.33 respectively. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Model 1-8   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Number of H1b STEM Employees 459 10,074 19,625 7 168,207 
Average Prevailing Wage for H1B 459 61,796 27,737 4,779 616,352 
Number of Native STEM Employees 459 222,317 306,560 7,290 2.285e+06 
Average Wage for Native STEM 459 72,792 18,485 44,400 431,270 
GDP All Industry Total 459 316,863 393,441 25,467 2.623e+06 
      
 
 Table 2 shows my summary statistics for model 9. My dependent variable, enrolled 
international students has a minimum of 526,670 and maximum of 903,127. My independent 
variables, Lag Optional Practical Training, Demand, and GDP all industry total have minimums 
of 22, 745, 1.013 and 1.056e+07 respectively. The maximums of 175,695, 5.356, and 1.851e+07 
respectively. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Model 9 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Year 16 2,008 4.761 2,001 2,016 
Enrolled International Students 16 658,914 133,449 526,670 903,127 
Lag Optional Practical Training 16 74,337 45,194 22,745 175,695 
Demand 16 3.651 1.301 1.013 5.356 
GDP all industry total  16 1.450e+07 2.447e+06 1.056e+07 1.851e+0
7 
      
 
 
4. Variables Used:  
For the purpose of my study, I used the total weighted average of prevailing wages for H-
1B workers from the years 2008 to 2016. In each dataset LCA required the employer to indicate 
how many workers were requested to be working at that specific site (Town, County, and State) 
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and what the prevailing wage was for the occupation, which was determined by the Department 
of Labor & Industries. If this wage was lower than the agreed upon wage when signing the 
contract, the worker was to be paid a different wage. However, for my study I decided to use the 
prevailing wage because not all wages were listed, and the wage depended on if the prevailing 
was higher or lower than the intended salary. For native workers, I used the weighted average of 
the average mean salary that was documented by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
For both native and nonimmigrant workers, I used the total number of workers in the 
STEM sector for the years 2008 to 2016 in order to examine growth in the STEM sector and to 
evaluate if the influx of H-1B workers into the STEM sector had an impact on native wage 
growth.  
 The ninth regression looks at the demand for the visa as a proxy for its competitiveness 
and the impact that this demand has on the enrollment of international students. I created a 
demand variable by dividing the number of petitions accepted by the USCIS by the cap for the 
period of 2001 to 2016. This demand variable is used as a proxy for competitiveness of the H-1B 
visa. Furthermore, I used the number of enrolled international students, and the OPT variable 
from the dataset spanning the years 2001 to 2016. These variables were modelled from the 
regression that Shih’s (2016) paper mentioned earlier.  
 All regressions used GDP All Industry total as a control variable.  
 
4.1 Limitations of the data 
 One limitation was the public nature of the information. I was not able to obtain 
individual level data due to time constraints: the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) would have 
taken months if I had tried to access individual level data. The only published historical years 
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available for the H-1B LCA were from 2008 to 2017. I omitted the 2017 data, as it had just come 
out and I wanted to look at a duration of 8 years for my study.  
 The types of data published by the Department of Labor Statistics differed from year to 
year. In the 2008 dataset for the H-1B visa, the occupations were worded differently from those 
in the datasets from 2009 onwards. For the 2008 dataset, I had to manually sort through and find 
the occupations that fell within the STEM sector. However, not all labels were very specific; 
therefore, some occupations that were not considered STEM could still have been present in the 
dataset. From 2009 onwards, I was able to use VLOOKUP in Excel to match the exact wording 
of the STEM occupation to the H-1B dataset.  
 Another limitation of the data related to the H-1B cap, this data came from the H-1B 
report from the USCIS which reports annually. These numbers show the total applicants who 
applied and were accepted but do not specify if the employer used an exception policy since the 
approved petitions for every year were significantly greater than the cap. The original cap for the 
H-1B visa was 65,000 with 20,000 extra visas allocated for workers with a master’s or doctorate 
degree. However, because many exemptions were used by employers to get approvals, more 
visas were issued than the cap limit. As well, the data published before 2001 did not appear to be 
very accurate so I decided to omit those years and look at the relationship between the years 
2001 and 2016.   
 
5. Methodology  
 
 For this study, I have created nine standard OLS regressions to answer the three questions 
that I posed at the outset. Eight of the regressions used panel data to address my first two 
questions, i.e. does having H-1B visa workers affect native employment within the STEM sector 
and does the prevailing average wage of an H-1B visa worker have an impact on native 
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employees’ annual average wages. The ninth regression used times series data. For the eight 
panel data regressions I used the Haussmann test to see if I needed to use Fixed Effects or 
Random Effects for my robustness check. My p-value was very close to 0 for both of the 
regressions and therefore I used the Fixed Effects model to correct for any correlation between 
my independent and dependent variables.  
 My first four regressions (models 1-4) attempt to answer the question does having H-1B 
visa workers affect native employment in the STEM sector in the US?  
 
Model 1 
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ1𝑏𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
The first regression was set up to find whether there were any contemporaneous effects of 
H-1B visa hires on the hiring of native employees. Therefore, I used the number of native STEM 
employees for the dependent variable and the number of H-1B STEM employees as the 
independent variable. I also used the GDP all industry total for all individual US states as the 
control variable in the model.   
 
Model 2 
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑ℎ1𝑏𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The second regression also used the number of native STEM employees as the dependent 
variable, but I lagged the number of H-1B STEM employees by a year to investigate whether 
their employment in the previous year impacted native employees in the current year. I kept the 
GDP all industry total for all individual US states as the control variable in the model.  
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Model 3 
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ1𝑏𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑ℎ1𝑏𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
My third regression was designed to investigate whether native employment was 
impacted by employment of H-1B visa workers over multiple years. I decided to investigate the 
impact of the hiring in the current and previous years by using both the lagged and unlagged 
number of H-1B visa workers as the independent variable. I kept my dependent variable 
unchanged as the number of native employees. And again, kept the GDP all industry total for all 
individual US states as the control variable in the model. 
 
Model 4 
𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ1𝑏𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2ℎ1𝑏𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
The fourth regression was set up to show the differential impact of H-1B visa hires on 
native employment across each of the states. I created interaction terms between the number of 
H-1B employees in each state and the state code that STATA provided. These terms show the 
differential impact across the states of H-1B workers employment on native employment. The 
GDP all industry total for all individual US states remained as the control variable in the model. 
My next four regressions (models 5-8) attempt to answer the question does the prevailing 
average wage of an H-1B visa worker have an impact on native employees’ annual average 
wages? 
 
Model 5 
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𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛ℎ1𝑏𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Regression number 5 used the natural log of the native wage as the dependent variable 
and the natural log of the H-1B average prevailing wage and the natural log of GDP as the 
independent variables. This regression should yield the impact of H-1B wages on native wages 
in contemporaneous periods, while controlling for changes in economic activity proxied by GDP, 
as in my previous regressions.  
 
Model 6 
𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛ℎ1𝑏𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 The sixth regression also has the natural log of native wages as the dependent 
variable, however, I used the natural log of H-1B wages lagged by a year. The independent 
variable natural log of GDP remained as before. The lagged variable attempts to assess whether 
there is a lagged effect of H-1B visa workers’ wages on the wages of native employees.  
 
Model 7 
𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑙𝑛ℎ1𝑏𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛ℎ1𝑏𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 As I had done with my regressions on employment, with my seventh regression I 
tried to assess whether there was a multi period impact on the wages of native employees. 
Specifically, keeping the natural log of native wages as my dependent variable, I increased the 
number of independent variables by adding the natural log of H-1B wages in the current year to 
Model 6. Thus, this regression was set up to show the impact of current and previous years’ H-
1B wages on native wages in the current year. 
 
 38 
Model 8 
𝑙𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛ℎ1𝑏𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛ℎ1𝑏𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
The eight regression includes the natural log of H-1B wage unlagged as well as the 
interaction terms of the natural log of H-1B wages in each state multiplied by the state code to 
analyze the differential impact across the States. The natural log of GDP is kept in as a control 
variable.  
My ninth regression differs as it was designed to answer the question how does the 
demand for the H-1B visa affect international enrollment? 
 
Model 9 
𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡
=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 For this regression, I used times series data. A common problem with time series data is 
that it needs to be corrected for autocorrelation among the error terms. Therefore, I used the 
newey regression in order to correct any standard errors and make sure that my regression was 
robust. This regression is similar to Shih (2016) who also analyzed the impact of the H-1B visa 
on international enrollment. We both used the same variables but in different ways. I used the 
natural log of enrolled international students as my dependent variable. My independent 
variables are demand, work visas issued under the OPT program, and state total GDP. Demand is 
defined as demand for the H-1B visa created by dividing the number of accepted applicants by 
the cap number for each year between 2001 and 2016. Shih (2016) decided to lag demand for the 
H-1B variable while I decided to lag the number of visas issued under OPT.  
 
 39 
6. Results  
The results of all of my different models are shown in tables 3 through 5 and provide 
interesting insights into the questions that I had previously posed.  
The first four regressions (models 1-4) answer the question does having H-1B visa 
workers affect native employment within the STEM sector?  
With the first model which examines contemporaneous impact on native employment I 
expected a positive relationship between the coefficients. The coefficient for the number of H-1B 
STEM employees was 7.145 which was significant at the 1% level. This signifies that for every 1 
H-1B worker, there are 7 native workers. The positive coefficient implies that H-1B workers are 
not substitutes for native employees but instead are complementary. And with significance being 
at the 1% level this complementary relationship appears to be very strong.  
With my second model with the lagged H-1B workers variable, I expected that there 
would be a positive relationship, given the first regression. However, the coefficient positive was 
not significant at any level. This implies that the previous year’s employment of H-1B visa 
workers did not impact the employment of native workers.  
Given the earlier results for my third model, I expected to see a positive relationship for 
both variables. The coefficient for the unlagged number of H-1B employees was 7.5, which is 
similar to the first regression with a coefficient of 7. Essentially signifying that for every 1 H-1B 
worker, there are approximately 7 native employees. This supported my expectations. However, 
the coefficient for the lagged H-1B variable turned negative but was still not significant. This 
reversal of signs may indicate multi-collinearity, which may invalidate the results of this model.  
For my fourth model which showed the differential impact across the states, I expected to 
see positive coefficients in states such as California, New York, Michigan and Texas as they 
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have high numbers of foreign workers in the STEM sector. Alabama was excluded from the 
regression results due to collinearity. However, not many states had a significant coefficient and 
the ones that did had negative coefficients. These states were: Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota, and Vermont. These results are not in line with my expectations and will be considered 
further in the discussion section of this paper. 
The next four regressions (models 5-8) answer the question do the wages of H-1B visa 
workers affect the wages of native employees within the STEM sector?  
The fifth model used the natural log of the native wage as the dependent variable and the 
natural log of the H-1B average prevailing wage and the natural log of GDP for the same year as 
the independent variables. I expected there to be a negative contemporaneous relationship 
between the coefficients. The coefficient indicated a negative relationship between the native 
wages and the H-1B wages, however it was not significant at any level.  
For the sixth model, I attempted to assess whether there were any lagged effects of the 
wages of H-1B workers on the wages of native employees. Thus, the independent variable, the 
natural log of the wages of H-1B visa workers is lagged by one year. The independent variable 
GDP stayed as before. Given the results of the first regression, I expected there to be a small, 
negative relationship in this regression. I found this negative relationship but it was not 
significant at any level.  
The seventh model examined the impact of the wages of H-1B workers over multiple 
years on the current wages of native employees. To do this, I used the independent variables 
regarding H-1B visa worker wages from both models 5 and 6, along with GDP as the control 
variable. Given the results of models 5 & 6, I expected to see small negative relationships with 
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both variables in model 7. And this exactly how it worked out. The coefficients for each variable 
changed somewhat, but they remained negative and insignificant.  
The eighth model shows the differential impact of H-1B worker wages on native wages 
across the states. Due to collinearity, Alabama was omitted from the results. The only state that 
had a significant and positive coefficient was Arizona with a coefficient of 0.180. Idaho, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin all had small but negative and significant coefficients.   
The ninth model attempted to answer the question how does the demand for the H-1B visa 
affect international student enrollment? My dependent variable is the natural log of enrollment of 
international students and my independent variables is the demand for the H-1B visa and one year 
lagged issuance of the Optional Practical Training (OPT) status. I lagged the OPT variable because 
students choose to obtain this visa after their four years at a college or university. The coefficient 
for demand was -0.032. This indicates that as the demand for the visa increases, fewer international 
students choose to enroll in universities and colleges. I will explain this result further below. 
 
7. Discussion 
7.1.  Does having H-1B visa workers affect native employment within the STEM sector? 
Table 3 presents the results of models 1 through 4, in each of which I have tried to assess 
the impact of employing workers with H-1B visas on the employment of native workers.  
 Model 1 tried to assess the contemporaneous relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables. It showed that the ratio for the current year was 1 H-1B worker to 
approximately 7 native workers. The ratio being positive indicates that H-1B workers are not being 
used as substitutes for native workers. This is an important, as one argument says that H-1B 
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workers are taking jobs away from native workers. My results, in fact, show the opposite and in a 
very significant sense. 
 Model 2 tried to assess whether there was a lagged relationship between the employment 
of the two types of workers. The coefficient was negative was not significant at any level. This 
implies that previous hiring of H-1B visa workers did not have a substantial impact on current 
native employment. Thus, it may also imply that the prior year’s public policy regarding H-1B 
visa issuance did not have a major impact on native employment in the STEM sector. This is 
surprising and did not fit my expectations.  
 Model 3 in table 3 shows the combined effect of current and previous year hiring of H-1B 
visa workers and potentially also the combined effect of current and lagged public policy with 
respect to the H-1B program. Again, the current year coefficient was 7.5, changing slightly from 
the first regression which showed 7.1. The lagged variable had no significance but indicated a 
negative relationship from previously being positive in model 2. This may indicate multi-
collinearity, and thus require a different specification of this model. 
 Model 4 showed the differential impact of H-1B worker hiring on native employment 
across each of the States. As stated in the results section, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Maine, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and 
Vermont were the only states that were significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level as well as negative. 
There were no positive, significant coefficients. The negative coefficients for the States indicate 
that H-1B workers are being used as a substitute for native workers. However, looking at the list 
of States, it is obvious that these are States that do not organically have a high level of STEM 
workers. For example, it is predicted that in Arkansas in 2018 STEM jobs will make up only 3% 
of all employment (Carnevale, Smith, Melton, 2017). Similarly, Delaware is predicted to have only 
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6% of all jobs in the STEM field (Carnevale, Smith, Melton, 2017). Hawaii, and North Dakota 
STEM sector will grow to 4% of all jobs while in Idaho, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont the STEM sector is predicted to be 5% of all jobs (Carnevale, Smith, 
Melton, 2017). Maine and South Dakota have a predicted growth of 3% in the STEM sector for 
2018. These percentages do not distinguish workers in the STEM fields by native and foreign born. 
The STEM sector in these states is small to begin with, which could account for employers 
attempting to bring in the highest qualified workers in order to meet their needs and ultimately 
help grow the sector.  
 Interestingly, a few states that were not significant were California, Michigan, New York 
and Texas. According to a report issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, these states have had 
had a huge boost in number of STEM jobs added since 2015. As well, according to Choudhury, 
Ruiz and Wilson (2012) New York, California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts and 
Texas had a high demand for H-1B workers between 2010-2011. The positive coefficients for all 
the states lead me to believe that H-1B workers are not being used as a substitute for native 
workers, but instead are complementary. However, since the coefficients are not significant at the 
1%, 5% or 10% level, I cannot conclude that that is what is going on. Reasons for the insignificance 
could be other influences such as the relatively larger size of STEM occupations in these states 
and the larger domestic populations. 
 
 7.2. Do the wages of H-1B visa workers affect the wages of native employees within the 
STEM sector? 
 Table 4 shows the results of models 5 through 8. These four models try to answer the 
question does the prevailing wage for the H-1B worker have an impact on native employees' 
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annual average wages? In each model I used the natural logs of the average wages of both H-1B 
and native workers as my independent and dependent variables respectively. And again State GDP 
was used an independent control variable in each model as well.  
 Model 5 looked at this question in a contemporaneous sense. I used the natural log of the 
average prevailing wages as the independent variable to show the effects of the H-1B wages. Its 
coefficient was negative but was not significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. This is important to 
note because the regression is saying that there is no significant impact on native wages given the 
H-1B wages which supports the argument that the hiring of H-1B workers is not impacting the 
competitive situation of native workers.  
 In model 6, I lagged the H-1B wage by one year in order to show the impact of previous 
year's hiring and potentially H-1B visa policy on native wages. The lagged variable had a 
coefficient of -0.339 but it was not significant at any level. This implies that last year's wages have 
a negative impact on native wages, but it is very small and is not meaningful.  
  Model 7 in table 4 combines the lagged and unlagged H-1B worker wages variable. Both 
variables were insignificant, however when they are combined in the same regression they both 
change signs. The unlagged H-1B variable was now negative while the lagged variable is positive. 
This changing of signs could be an indication of multicollinearity. Which likely indicates that 
while the overall model result is okay, that the coefficients for each variable are unstable and not 
to be relied upon.   
 Model 8 showed the differential impact of H-1B visa workers’ wages on native wages 
across each of the states. There was only one positive and significant state, Arizona, which had a 
coefficient of 0.180. The coefficient implies that for every 1% in wages that an H-1B worker 
makes, the native worker makes 0.18% more in wages. This is noteworthy because it shows in a 
 45 
state that is not traditionally a STEM state, they are paying the native workers much more. 
However, this result was found in only one state, and it warrants further investigation to ensure 
that it is not a data issue. The states that were significant and negative were: Idaho, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  However, in all these states the negative coefficients 
were small. This implies a small gap between H-1B visa workers and native wages. This is very 
noteworthy because it evidences that the Office of Foreign Labor Certification’s (OFLC) condition 
of paying an H-1B visa worker the average prevailing wage is working. Furthermore, the OFLC 
wants to make sure that H-1B wages do not adversely affect the wages or working conditions of 
similarly employed U.S. workers. For this reason, it would make sense why many of the States 
including California, Michigan, New York and Texas do not show as significant because if those 
employers are paying the average prevailing wage (which was recorded in the dataset published 
by the OFLC) then H-1B wages should not be affecting native wages. 
7.3. How does the demand for the H-1B visa affect international student enrollment? 
 The last regression, model 9, used in my study analyzes the question how does the demand 
of the H-1B visa effect international enrollment? This regression is found in table 5. My dependent 
variable is the natural log of the enrolled international students and my independent variables were 
the demand for the visa, created by dividing the number of applications accepted by the cap number 
for each year from 2001 to 2016, as well as the one year lagged variable of OPT. The demand 
variable had a coefficient -0.032 which was significant at the 10% level. The lagged variable of 
OPT was 3.98e-06 which was significant at the 5% level. Both of these results are noteworthy. 
The demand coefficient indicates that as demand for the visa increased, international enrollment 
decreased. The result might seem counterintuitive but in fact, it is not. International students 
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consider many factors when applying and ultimately choosing to attend school in the United States 
as Hazens and Alberts (2006) analyzed in their study. The H-1B visa policy does play a part in a 
student's choice to enroll in a four-year university or college if they intend on finding a US job 
after graduation. Shih’s (2016) study also pointed out that students use the H-1B visa policy as a 
benchmark for the openness of the United States labor market, post-graduation. However, it is 
important to note that the entire decision of an international student attending school in the United 
States does not rely on the H-1B visa policy. There are many other factors such as standard of 
living, political and social tensions, lack of family, friends and support systems as well as language 
barriers, which all impact a student's decision to come to the US and to stay on. As for the OPT 
variable, it makes sense that it would have a positive coefficient because the OPT status is available 
for any student who chooses to pursue the visa after graduation.  
 
7.4 Policy Implications 
 There are many policy implications for the changing of the H-1B visa regulations for the 
STEM sector. H-1B workers are required to have a high level of education and skill and employers 
have to petition the USCIS to be able to retain these workers for an additional three years, every 
time their existing term is up. Reforming the policy and making it stricter will strongly impact the 
STEM sector which brings in talented foreign-workers from abroad and from US universities and 
colleges when they cannot find native workers. In Watts (2009) study, she found that the IT 
industry had a huge lack of workers, yet Americans were not able to fill the jobs because there 
simply weren’t enough who were qualified. Employers have lobbied the government to increase 
the cap for H-1B workers so that their companies could retain more foreign workers. Reducing the 
cap, or causing more backlog in the system will therefore heavily impact the STEM sector who 
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need these workers. As seen from my first four regressions in table 3, the states with the highest 
growth in STEM workers are using the H-1B workers as complements to native workers and not 
terminating native workers based on the hiring of the H-1B workers. The substitution of workers 
is only found in States where the STEM sector is small, and not as prominent or as extensive as in 
states such as California.  
 Regarding the wage debate, there is evidence in my study that there is a gap between native 
and foreign-born workers' wages. However, states with negative coefficients such as Idaho, 
Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin are not known for booming STEM sectors. As 
well, it is important to note that the coefficients were very small and did not indicate that there is 
a huge gap between native worker's average wages and H-1B workers prevailing average wage. 
There also could be other explanations for the gap, such as skill and experience gaps between the 
two sets of workers.  
 Lastly, reducing the H-1B visa has strong implications for foreign students. My results 
indicate that as the H-1B visa becomes more in demand by applicants less foreign students are 
willing to attend university or college in the United States. This has big implications for policy 
makers who want to reduce the visa. Already with the 65,000 cap and the 20,000 for Masters/PhD, 
the applicant pool is still big. Currently, the fiscal year of 2019 (not included in this study) had 
94,213 petitions eligible for the cap, meaning that these did not include petitions that cited an 
exemption. 94,213 applications are much larger than the 65,000 visas that are available (H-1B 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 Cap Season, no date). Potential students could see this as a deterrent to 
continuing their higher education in the United States because they might believe that the visa 
would be too hard for prospective employers to obtain. Any potential changes in policy could steer 
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foreign students to look at countries with more friendly work and immigration policies such as 
Canada, Australia and Germany.  
 
8. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I used data from the LCA, OES, BEA, USCIS, and International Student Inc 
in order to answer my three research questions: (1) Does having H-1B visa workers affect native 
US employment within the STEM sector? (2) Do H-1B visa workers’ wages have an impact on 
native employees' wages? (3) How is international student enrolment affected by the demand for 
the H-1B visa?  
 I found that there is a positive relationship between the number of H-1B visa workers and 
native workers. However, the relationship varies among states, with different states either using 
the workers as substitutes or compliments. In states where there is a big STEM program and many 
companies such as California, it is noted that the coefficient is insignificant indicating that the H-
1B workers and the native workers are being used as compliments to each other and not substitutes.  
 For my second question, I found that there is a small wage gap between native workers and 
H-1B workers that favor the native worker. The gap, which is very small does not fit my 
expectations. However, it exists in states that do not have a large STEM program and potentially 
could have a hard time attracting high-skilled foreign labor to their state.  
 The last question, I found that there was a negative relationship between the demand for 
the H-1B visa and the enrollment of international students, signaling that as the 
demand/competitiveness increases for the H-1B visa, the enrollment of international students does 
decrease.  
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All three questions that I have discussed are important to consider when creating a new 
policy for the H-1B visa because it has an impact on the STEM sector and the future of universities 
and colleges in the United States, some of which rely on the higher tuitions paid by foreign 
students.  
8.1 Limitations and Future Research 
 There are limitations to my study, such as the state level data only gives an overview of the 
effect that H-1B worker employment and wages have on native employment and wages within the 
STEM sector. Another limitation of the results in regard to the third question is that there are many 
other factors that could explain why international enrolment may decrease such as social and 
political tension, standard of living, and lack of family and friends in the United States. Currently, 
with the political conditions in the United States I would expect factors such as social tensions and 
the standard of life to be heavy contributing factors.  
 Looking ahead, my paper opens up different avenues for future research. The first being, 
the use of more individual level data to get more conclusive results on how the changes in 
employment of H-1B workers affects employment of native United States workers in the STEM 
sector as well on their wages. With the individual level data, to the analysis could be conducted at 
the occupational level to see if there are any disruptions or disparities within the different 
occupations within the STEM sector. Research could also be expanded to analyze demand by city 
or state to enhance our understanding of the effects in more local economics. The city level 
analyses could be conducted regarding international students as well, to examine how the higher 
tuition benefits the university and the economy of the town the institution is in. Another way to 
accurately measure the effect of the H-1B on the STEM labor market would be to create an 
interaction term with unemployment in the sector and the national unemployment rate. Lastly, my 
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study creates the possibility of combining the countries of origin of enrolled international students 
and the countries that are receiving the most H-1B visas to see how US visa policy affects them 
and their decision making. Hopefully, future research will be able to show the impacts of the 
current United States administration's policy on the STEM sector, as well as the demand for the 
H-1B visa and the enrollment of international students.  
 
 
 51 
Appendix  
 
Table 3: Does having an H-1B visa workers affect native employment within the STEM sector? 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Number of Native 
STEM Employees 
Number of Native 
STEM Employees 
Number of Native 
STEM Employees 
Number of Native 
STEM Employees 
     
Number of H-1B 
Employees 
7.145*** 
(1.556) 
 7.519** 
(3.064) 
1.693 
(9.243) 
 
GDP All Industry 
Total 
0.0251 
(0.469) 
0.673 
(0.467) 
0.121 
(0.481) 
-0.991 
(0.635) 
Number of H-1B 
Employees Lagged 
 
 
 
 
2.536 
(1.723) 
-2.052 
(2.851) 
 
 
Alaska Interaction    -370.7 
(315.5) 
     
Arizona Interaction    3.550 
(9.546) 
     
Arkansas Interaction    -20.56** 
(9.504) 
     
California Interaction    9.026 
(9.686) 
     
Colorado Interaction    11.95 
(9.603) 
     
Connecticut 
Interaction 
   -3.126 
(8.809) 
     
District of Columbia 
Interaction 
   -8.048 
(16.10) 
     
Delaware interaction    -24.39*** 
(9.367) 
     
Florida Interaction    13.03 
(10.96) 
     
Georgia Interaction    5.750 
(9.655) 
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Hawaii Interaction    -155.7** 
(70.77) 
     
Idaho Interaction    -127.4** 
(55.89) 
     
Illinois Interaction    6.075 
(9.753) 
     
Indiana Interaction    8.702 
(10.58) 
     
Iowa Interaction    -1.931 
(9.162) 
     
Kansas Interaction    -18.62* 
(9.578) 
     
Kentucky Interaction    -8.127 
(10.41) 
     
Louisiana Interaction    -29.02* 
(15.80) 
     
Maine Interaction    -134.2*** 
(24.53) 
     
Maryland Interaction    17.98 
(11.40) 
     
Massachusetts 
Interaction 
   7.635 
(9.767) 
     
Michigan Interaction    10.82 
(10.10) 
     
Minnesota Interaction    6.951 
(9.462) 
     
Mississippi 
Interaction 
   -166.7 
(107.5) 
     
Montana Interaction    -78.79 
(81.00) 
     
Nebraska Interaction    -24.72** 
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(11.17) 
     
Nevada interaction    -47.54 
(29.92) 
     
New Hampshire 
Interaction 
   -36.08*** 
(11.62) 
     
New Jersey 
Interaction 
   1.990 
(9.327) 
     
New Mexico 
Interaction 
   -59.17** 
(25.63) 
     
New York Interaction    13.93 
(11.23) 
     
North  Carolina 
Interaction 
   4.123 
(10.16) 
     
North Dakota 
Interaction 
   -172.1*** 
(64.94) 
     
Ohio Interaction    10.11 
(9.978) 
     
Oklahoma Interaction    -1.821 
(17.77) 
     
Oregon Interaction    -2.025 
(8.970) 
     
Pennsylvania 
Interaction 
   4.335 
(9.827) 
     
Rhode Island 
Interaction 
   -40.16*** 
(9.596) 
     
South Carolina 
Interaction 
   -3.187 
(11.79) 
     
South Dakota 
Interaction 
   -119.7*** 
(37.62) 
     
Tennessee Interaction    2.522 
(9.615) 
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Texas Interaction    12.09 
(11.61) 
     
Utah interaction    -4.110 
(11.99) 
     
Vermont Interaction    -259.1** 
(121.0) 
     
Virginia Interaction    13.23 
(10.16) 
     
Washington 
interaction 
   6.336 
(9.779) 
     
West Virginia 
Interaction 
   -119.4 
(130.7) 
     
Wisconsin Interaction    3.976 
(9.445) 
     
Wyoming Interaction    -787.7 
(1,314) 
 
 
Dummy Variables 
 
    
2009 4,268   -3,560 
 (16,260)   (11,761) 
2010 15,783 38,603* 6,558 28,324** 
 (14,516) (20,287) (20,166) (13,529) 
2011 140,715*** 159,887*** 138,640*** 166,615*** 
 (20,553) (21,479) (19,763) (22,613) 
2012 130,446*** 177,713*** 129,132*** 167,375*** 
 (19,949) (24,594) (22,773) (23,015) 
2013 123,132*** 157,958*** 132,186*** 170,407*** 
 (22,799) (28,289) (25,105) (27,091) 
2014 136,987*** 159,754*** 147,220*** 195,265*** 
 (25,470) (31,432) (28,161) (30,856) 
2015 109,293*** 160,970*** 116,378*** 188,272*** 
 (30,190) (34,684) (30,276) (36,114) 
2016 -34,028 -15,404 -15,945 38,132 
 (22,866) (31,460) (27,704) (29,995) 
Alaska -97,365 -23,912 -93,414 -178,999* 
 (64,185) (67,576) (66,704) (93,918) 
 55 
Arizona 50,265 28,834 44,675 144,128** 
 (36,964) (40,254) (36,319) (58,646) 
Arkansas -91,595** -37,736 -88,243** -93,481* 
 (42,735) (44,289) (44,741) (51,441) 
California 728,178 -53,561 695,537 2.443e+06** 
 (830,941) (907,358) (850,481) (1.152e+06) 
Colorado 83,636* 61,335 89,390** 126,923*** 
 (43,274) (46,623) (44,042) (48,466) 
Connecticut  -64,099** -52,384 -62,468** 82,566* 
 (29,617) (32,653) (30,088) (43,046) 
District of Columbia -49,701 2,876 -43,319 -104,495* 
 (38,730) (40,078) (39,966) (55,153) 
Delaware -114,348* -29,285 -107,863 -142,449* 
 (64,525) (64,953) (67,229) (77,689) 
Florida 251,474 -42,503 230,154 740,131** 
 (277,504) (286,048) (283,248) (339,650) 
Georgia  26,937 -45,303 26,124 285,525** 
 (113,925) (124,654) (115,893) (141,211) 
Hawaii -91,704 -28,750 -88,577 -160,724** 
 (56,161) (58,999) (58,084) (78,657) 
Idaho -79,452 -5,328 -74,278 -127,561 
 (62,122) (64,625) (64,382) (78,324) 
Illinois  76,027 -106,066 67,030 582,551** 
 (227,384) (244,399) (232,284) (289,830) 
Indiana 21,965 -33,662 16,967 120,069** 
 (53,538) (56,477) (55,028) (59,539) 
Iowa -111,928** -63,051* -105,845* -77,949** 
 (45,904) (34,996) (60,328) (37,046) 
Kansas -48,379* -13,565 -45,583 -37,849 
 (28,502) (30,715) (29,668) (37,656) 
Kentucky -51,642*** -37,354* -50,378*** -22,258 
 (16,746) (20,649) (17,998) (27,571) 
Louisiana  -37,067 -69,240** -44,426 53,391 
 (26,489) (30,381) (27,306) (39,147) 
Maine -94,852 -16,849 -89,701 -130,545 
 (65,564) (68,029) (67,957) (80,988) 
Maryland 136,711** 97,060 145,558** 162,113** 
 (59,002) (65,546) (62,769) (80,054) 
Massachusetts  134,038 70,902 142,089 342,803** 
 (108,526) (119,959) (111,446) (133,407) 
Michigan 159,020 78,521 160,094 322,386*** 
 (104,466) (111,641) (106,888) (122,187) 
Minnesota  44,940 27,595 50,717 134,454** 
 (46,988) (53,121) (48,509) (56,081) 
Mississippi -82,954*** -132,282*** -96,375** 35,729 
 (30,428) (49,952) (38,477) (79,124) 
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Missouri 25,138 97,292*** 40,657 7,215 
 (29,303) (36,619) (38,160) (56,809) 
Montana -91,189 -7,857 -85,227 -224,473** 
 (70,076) (72,586) (72,462) (98,656) 
Nebraska  -75,119* -21,093 -70,931 -107,922* 
 (44,174) (45,850) (45,431) (60,097) 
Nevada  -78,027** -46,342 -78,463** -84,472* 
 (32,393) (36,034) (34,040) (47,582) 
New Hampshire -87,656 -12,039 -81,775 -128,928* 
 (59,820) (61,501) (62,112) (74,672) 
New Jersey -59,007 -85,051 -49,451 405,508** 
 (141,615) (159,529) (142,999) (192,750) 
New Mexico -63,351 -6,913 -59,657 -117,799* 
 (48,522) (51,347) (50,408) (69,165) 
New York 246,594 -304,557 199,362 1.109e+06* 
 (500,683) (522,695) (518,700) (592,708) 
North Carolina 30,021 -68,613 21,338 313,601** 
 (122,596) (131,540) (126,531) (145,616) 
North Dakota  -105,024 -26,087 -100,354 -192,216** 
 (68,571) (71,091) (70,451) (93,340) 
Ohio 137,144 -1,896 134,372 418,099** 
 (160,580) (171,202) (165,150) (196,060) 
Oklahoma  -35,319** -26,023 -35,833** -44,790 
 (16,592) (21,921) (17,006) (30,587) 
Oregon  -21,201 -9,232 -18,386 27,202 
 (15,659) (18,360) (16,420) (18,459) 
Pennsylvania  114,412 -35,345 104,785 601,605** 
 (202,168) (214,794) (206,059) (258,529) 
Rhode Island -107,142 -21,253 -100,519 -149,155* 
 (67,928) (69,208) (70,624) (83,564) 
South Carolina  -23,133 -12,714 -23,000 -12,013 
 (14,375) (17,951) (14,733) (24,738) 
South Dakota -107,087 -24,350 -102,074 -194,163* 
 (70,764) (73,334) (73,148) (99,457) 
Tennessee  -19,051 -49,297 -20,987 93,580* 
 (42,431) (46,827) (43,910) (48,934) 
Texas 504,698 -25,549 477,712 1.450e+06** 
 (551,503) (594,195) (577,792) (626,235) 
Utah -28,777 10,896 -24,026 -69,341 
 (30,483) (31,676) (31,305) (44,882) 
Vermont -107,048 -15,408 -100,708 -190,806* 
 (76,923) (79,499) (79,653) (98,622) 
Virginia  213,614* 137,941 226,946* 358,021** 
 (118,641) (126,408) (120,848) (152,022) 
Washington  103,244 65,793 111,391 297,182*** 
 (91,941) (102,875) (94,135) (110,253) 
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West Virginia -91,499 -25,940 -88,143 -171,164** 
 (57,770) (60,643) (59,761) (81,218) 
Wisconsin  21,248 7,429 24,775 119,048** 
 (40,603) (45,206) (42,857) (48,646) 
Wyoming  -107,864 -25,502 -103,482 -223,545** 
 (71,528) (74,812) (74,379) (105,185) 
     
     
Constant 55,369 -86,834 36,096 213,854* 
 (80,535) (80,469) (84,657) (113,495) 
 
Fixed Effects?  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 459 408 408 459 
R-squared 0.916 0.911 0.924 0.934 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
Table 4: Does the prevailing average wage of an H-1B visa worker have an impact on native 
employees’ annual average wages?  
 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Natural Log 
Average 
Wage for 
Native 
STEM 
Worker 
Natural Log 
Average Wage for 
Native STEM 
Worker 
Natural Log 
Average Wage for 
Native STEM 
Worker 
Natural Log 
Average Wage for 
Native STEM 
Worker 
     
Natural Log Average 
Prevailing Wage for H-
1B STEM Worker 
-0.0362 
(0.0465) 
 -0.421 
(0.410) 
0.0187 
(0.191) 
 
H-1B Prevailing Wage  -0.339 
(0.466) 
4.139 
(4.008) 
 
Natural Log GDP all 
industry total  
-0.0110 
(0.0158) 
-0.0110 
(0.0158) 
-0.0102 
(0.0156) 
-0.0144 
(0.0198) 
     
Alaska Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.100 
(0.130) 
     
Arizona Wage 
Interaction 
   0.180* 
(0.108) 
     
Arkansas Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.353 
(0.260) 
     
California Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0585 
(0.0992) 
     
Colorado Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.116 
(0.112) 
     
Connecticut Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0369 
(0.108) 
     
District of Columbia 
Wage Interaction 
   -0.0861 
(0.108) 
     
Delaware Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0519 
(0.139) 
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Florida Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0751 
(0.108) 
     
Georgia Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0631 
(0.103) 
     
Hawaii Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.119 
(0.130) 
     
Idaho Wage Interaction    -0.328** 
(0.139) 
     
Illinois Wage 
Interaction 
   0.000577 
(0.213) 
     
Indiana Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.273** 
(0.135) 
     
Iowa Wage Interaction    -0.0164 
(0.193) 
     
Kansas Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.220 
(0.141) 
     
Kentucky Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.601*** 
(0.213) 
     
Louisiana Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.149 
(0.126) 
     
Maine Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.223** 
(0.100) 
     
Maryland Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.158* 
(0.0944) 
     
Massachusetts Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.311*** 
(0.0950) 
     
Michigan Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.517*** 
(0.179) 
     
Minnesota Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.115 
(0.104) 
     
Mississippi Wage    -0.173 
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Interaction (0.109) 
     
Montana Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.238 
(0.327) 
     
Nebraska Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0318 
(0.100) 
     
Nevada Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.418*** 
(0.133) 
     
New Hampshire Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0417 
(0.124) 
     
New Jersey Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.201 
(0.135) 
     
New Mexico Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.166 
(0.122) 
     
New York Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0174 
(0.0942) 
     
North Carolina Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0987 
(0.163) 
     
North Dakota Wage 
Interaction 
   0.0102 
(0.104) 
     
Ohio Wage Interaction    -0.134 
(0.0952) 
     
Oklahoma Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0569 
(0.105) 
     
Oregon Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0404 
(0.120) 
     
Pennsylvania Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.271** 
(0.125) 
     
Rhode Island Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.180* 
(0.104) 
     
South Carolina Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.281** 
(0.127) 
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South Dakota Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0896 
(0.125) 
     
Tennessee Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.126 
(0.0933) 
     
Texas Wage Interaction    -0.0507 
(0.109) 
     
Utah Wage Interaction    -0.142 
(0.102) 
     
Vermont Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.255** 
(0.114) 
     
Virginia Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.125 
(0.103) 
     
Washington Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0192 
(0.0971) 
     
West Virginia Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.401* 
(0.225) 
     
Wisconsin Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.337*** 
(0.109) 
     
Wyoming Wage 
Interaction 
   -0.0908 
(0.115) 
 
Dummy Variables 
    
2009 0.0318*** 0.0318*** 0.0315*** 0.0365*** 
 (0.00778) (0.00770) (0.00810) (0.0107) 
2010 0.0648*** 0.0646*** 0.0645*** 0.0705*** 
 (0.00774) (0.00764) (0.00797) (0.0141) 
2011 0.0604*** 0.0597*** 0.0624*** 0.0715*** 
 (0.00860) (0.00822) (0.00972) (0.0223) 
2012 0.0647*** 0.0640*** 0.0650*** 0.0775*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0111) (0.0288) 
2013 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.139** 
 (0.0401) (0.0395) (0.0402) (0.0625) 
2014 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0111) (0.0115) (0.0353) 
2015 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.120*** 0.138*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0109) (0.0127) (0.0391) 
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2016 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.170*** 0.190*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0129) (0.0136) (0.0440) 
Alaska 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.110*** 1.211 
 (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0209) (1.406) 
Arizona -0.0110 -0.0117 -0.0103 -2.010* 
 (0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0165) (1.195) 
Arkansas -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111*** 3.726 
 (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0345) (2.848) 
California 0.220*** 0.218*** 0.222*** 0.869 
 (0.0475) (0.0464) (0.0482) (1.086) 
Colorado 0.0936*** 0.0926*** 0.0948*** 1.369 
 (0.0159) (0.0154) (0.0159) (1.238) 
Connecticut  0.107*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.509 
 (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.0146) (1.199) 
District of Columbia 0.264*** 0.263*** 0.267*** 1.209 
 (0.0155) (0.0152) (0.0150) (1.171) 
Delaware  0.0569*** 0.0561*** 0.0589*** 0.619 
 (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0201) (1.514) 
Florida -0.0145 -0.0147 -0.0154 0.811 
 (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0254) (1.191) 
Georgia  0.00847 0.00795 0.00850 0.701 
 (0.0192) (0.0189) (0.0190) (1.132) 
Hawaii -0.00157 -0.00199 -0.000348 1.300 
 (0.0179) (0.0180) (0.0174) (1.420) 
Idaho  -0.0695*** -0.0701*** -0.0678*** 3.543** 
 (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0202) (1.528) 
Illinois 0.0555* 0.0541* 0.0582* 0.0409 
 (0.0291) (0.0282) (0.0307) (2.333) 
Indiana  -0.0511*** -0.0512*** -0.0514*** 2.935** 
 (0.0134) (0.0133) (0.0131) (1.481) 
Iowa -0.0762*** -0.0758*** -0.0641*** 0.113 
 (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0138) (2.107) 
Kansas -0.0360*** -0.0362*** -0.0356*** 2.367 
 (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0124) (1.535) 
Kentucky -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.106*** 6.449*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0162) (2.325) 
Louisiana  -0.0271** -0.0270** -0.0276** 1.595 
 (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0108) (1.378) 
Maine  -0.0783*** -0.0784*** -0.0772*** 2.360** 
 (0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0215) (1.082) 
Maryland 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.164*** 1.904* 
 (0.0146) (0.0143) (0.0145) (1.029) 
Massachusetts  0.161*** 0.160*** 0.162*** 3.612*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0217) (0.0224) (1.048) 
Michigan 0.0176 0.0170 0.0176 5.710*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0196) (1.987) 
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Minnesota  0.0317** 0.0311** 0.0324** 1.293 
 (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0148) (1.141) 
Mississippi  -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.109*** 1.772 
 (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0124) (1.185) 
Missouri -0.0567*** -0.0571*** -0.0560*** -0.0613** 
 (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0237) 
Montana -0.240*** -0.240*** -0.239*** 2.345 
 (0.0587) (0.0586) (0.0585) (3.519) 
Nebraska -0.0907*** -0.0907*** -0.0901*** 0.255 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0141) (1.095) 
Nevada 0.00176 0.00113 0.00291 4.608*** 
 (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0139) (1.462) 
New Hampshire 0.0291 0.0284 0.0309 0.480 
 (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0189) (1.353) 
New Jersey 0.161*** 0.160*** 0.162*** 2.384 
 (0.0225) (0.0220) (0.0225) (1.523) 
New Mexico 0.0302* 0.0299* 0.0311** 1.843 
 (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0153) (1.321) 
New York  0.122*** 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.311 
 (0.0365) (0.0359) (0.0365) (1.042) 
North Carolina 0.235 0.233 0.247 1.333 
 (0.215) (0.212) (0.226) (1.748) 
North Dakota -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.133*** -0.245 
 (0.0268) (0.0266) (0.0264) (1.132) 
Ohio -0.000434 -0.000778 -0.000827 1.467 
 (0.0208) (0.0207) (0.0205) (1.047) 
Oklahoma  -0.0786*** -0.0784*** -0.0788*** 0.543 
 (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0106) (1.144) 
Oregon 0.0266* 0.0253* 0.0286* 0.464 
 (0.0148) (0.0141) (0.0148) (1.342) 
Pennsylvania  0.0632** 0.0626** 0.0631** 3.056** 
 (0.0247) (0.0244) (0.0246) (1.368) 
Rhode Island 0.0729*** 0.0724*** 0.0747*** 2.041* 
 (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0223) (1.126) 
South Carolina -0.0815*** -0.0816*** -0.0814*** 2.988** 
 (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0112) (1.383) 
South Dakota -0.214*** -0.214*** -0.213*** 0.756 
 (0.0272) (0.0270) (0.0268) (1.348) 
Tennessee -0.0487*** -0.0488*** -0.0489*** 1.332 
 (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0117) (1.018) 
Texas 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.668 
 (0.0365) (0.0361) (0.0363) (1.222) 
Utah -0.0416*** -0.0420*** -0.0409*** 1.510 
 (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0121) (1.104) 
Vermont -0.0745** -0.0750** -0.0724** 2.723** 
 (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0305) (1.232) 
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Virginia 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.114*** 1.495 
 (0.0205) (0.0200) (0.0205) (1.147) 
Washington 0.108*** 0.106*** 0.110*** 0.310 
 (0.0229) (0.0218) (0.0235) (1.049) 
West Virginia -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.114*** 4.248* 
 (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0204) (2.437) 
Wisconsin  -0.0387*** -0.0389*** -0.0387*** 3.654*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0136) (1.196) 
Wyoming -0.113*** -0.113*** -0.112*** 0.872 
 (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0264) (1.235) 
     
     
Constant 11.63*** 12.04*** 5.923 11.06*** 
 (0.589) (1.178) (5.047) (2.078) 
     
Observations 459 459 459 459 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.636 0.636 0.639 0.644 
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Table 5: How is international student enrollment affected by the demand of the H-1B visa?  
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Enrolled 
International 
Students 
  
Demand -0.0320* 
 (0.0177) 
OPT lag 3.98e-06** 
 (1.46e-06) 
GDP All Industry Total 2.91e-08 
 (2.82e-08) 
Constant 12.81*** 
 (0.268) 
  
Observations 15 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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